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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge 
Appellant Zachary Wilson holds the remarkable 
distinction of having received writs of habeas corpus vacating 
not one, but two murder convictions. These victories have 
been Pyrrhic, however, as Wilson has remained incarcerated 
since the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania decided to 
prosecute him anew for both crimes. After his rearraignment 
in state court, Wilson promptly returned to federal court and 
filed motions seeking to bar a retrial. The District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied Wilson’s motions 
and he filed this appeal. 
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I 
 The facts underlying Wilson’s convictions have no 
bearing here, but the unusual procedural posture of the case 
requires us to describe in some detail what transpired in the 
state courts and in the District Court.  
 Wilson was convicted in 1984 by a jury in the 
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas of murdering 
David Swift and was sentenced to life in prison. Four years 
later, a different Philadelphia jury convicted him of an 
unrelated crime: the murder of Jamie Lamb. Wilson was 
sentenced to death for that offense, in part because of his 
previous conviction for murdering Swift.  
After Wilson exhausted his direct and collateral 
appeals in state court, he filed a federal habeas petition under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that his conviction in the Swift 
case was unconstitutional because the jury was empaneled in 
violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). On April 
19, 2004, the District Court granted the writ, stating: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. IT IS 
FURTHER ORDERED that [Wilson’s] 
convictions of May 16, 1984 for First Degree 
Murder and Possessing an Instrument of Crime 
. . . are VACATED. The Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania may retry [Wilson] on these 
charges within 180 days of the date of this 
Order. 
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 Wilson v. Beard, 314 F. Supp. 2d 434, 450 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
The District Court’s opinion in support of its order noted that 
Wilson was on death row for his conviction in the Lamb 
murder. Id. at 439. The Commonwealth appealed the order of 
the District Court and we affirmed. Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 
653 (3d Cir. 2005).   
At no point during the federal court proceedings in the 
Swift case did the Commonwealth ask the District Court to 
stay its order pending appeal or for an extension of the 180-
day period established by the District Court. Yet Wilson was 
neither retried nor released because he was on death row for 
the Lamb murder. Between November 2, 2005, and February 
18, 2010, there was no activity in the case.  
 After the District Court vacated Wilson’s conviction 
for the Swift murder and while that order was under review 
by our Court, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
seeking to invalidate his conviction for the Lamb murder. 
This time, Wilson claimed the Commonwealth violated Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding exculpatory 
information that would have allowed him to impeach the 
three main witnesses against him. The District Court 
conditionally issued a writ in August 2006, stating that the 
Commonwealth “may retry [Wilson] on these charges within 
180 days of the date of this Order,” Wilson v. Beard, 2006 
WL 2346277, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2006). Once again, the 
Commonwealth appealed and we affirmed the order of the 
District Court. Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Soon after we affirmed the District Court’s order 
granting Wilson habeas relief in the Lamb case, the 
Commonwealth moved to retry him for the Swift murder, 
nearly five and a half years after the District Court had 
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vacated that conviction. On January 22, 2010, the 
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas appointed 
counsel for Wilson in connection with the Swift retrial, and 
on February 16, 2010, he was arraigned.1  
Two days later, Wilson filed a motion to enforce writ 
of habeas corpus in the District Court, seeking to prevent the 
Commonwealth from retrying him because it waited more 
than 180 days to do so. The District Court held argument on 
the motion to enforce and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. 
Prior to the scheduled hearing, Wilson filed a motion seeking 
relief under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.2 As with his motion to enforce, Wilson contended 
the Commonwealth should be barred from retrying him 
because it had failed to do so within the 180 days required by 
the District Court’s order. In the alternative—that is, if the 
Court interpreted “may retry . . . within 180 days” as “retry 
within 180 days or else release him”—Wilson requested an 
unconditional writ barring any retrial for the Swift murder. 
App. 12-13.  
The District Court held four evidentiary hearings on 
the motions, after which the parties filed proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. The District Court heard final 
argument on April 11, 2012.  
                                                 
1 The Commonwealth also moved to retry Wilson for 
the Lamb murder, arraigning him in October 2010. 
2 The relevant portion of Rule 60(b) reads: “On motion 
and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: 
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.” 
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Nine days later, Judge Padova issued a thorough 
opinion denying Wilson’s motions. Wilson v. Beard, 2012 
WL 1382447, *1 (E.D. Pa. April 20, 2012). He observed that 
Wilson “cite[d] no authority for the proposition that we may 
bar his retrial based solely on the Commonwealth’s failure to 
retry him within 180 days,” and he opined that Wilson’s 
arguments “evidence[d] a misunderstanding of the nature of a 
conditional writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at *5. According to the 
District Court, the Commonwealth’s failure to retry Wilson 
within 180 days automatically converted the conditional writ 
to an absolute writ, which meant that after the deadline 
passed, the Commonwealth could no longer imprison Wilson 
based on the Swift murder conviction. Id. This was unavailing 
to Wilson, however, because he “was not held in custody in 
connection with his conviction for the Swift murder at any 
time after the [w]rit became absolute in this case.” Id. at *6. 
In the District Court’s view: “between January 7, 1988 and 
June 9, 2010, he was held as a convicted prisoner awaiting 
execution for the murder of Jamie Lamb. Since June 9, 2010, 
Wilson has been held as a pretrial murder defendant in 
connection with his retrials for both the Swift and Lamb 
murders.” Id. Accordingly, the District Court held that its 
order granting the writ simply returned Wilson to the position 
he was in before his incarceration: under indictment for the 
crime. Id. Thus, even though the Commonwealth “failed to 
commence proceedings related to the retrial within the 180 
day time period,” it did not violate the terms of the writ. Id. 
The District Court then denied Wilson’s Rule 60(b) 
motion, which had sought essentially the same relief as the 
motion to enforce, but on more complex grounds. There, 
Wilson argued that he should not suffer a retrial “because the 
Commonwealth’s delay in commencing the proceedings 
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related to his retrial . . . created extraordinary circumstances 
which may be remedied only by such relief.” Id. 
Wilson claimed extraordinary circumstances for three 
principal reasons. First, “the Commonwealth delayed 
commencing his reprosecution for the Swift murder for more 
than five years after [the District Court] granted the [w]rit.” 
Id. at *7. Second, “during the time in which the 
Commonwealth delayed his retrial, his mental condition 
deteriorated to such an extent that he is no longer competent 
to stand trial.” Id. Finally, his attorneys “recently discovered 
that the prosecution committed a Brady violation at his trial 
with respect to [a key prosecution witness, whose] mental 
condition has deteriorated so dramatically since 2005 that he 
would not be competent to testify at Wilson’s retrial or to be 
cross-examined about the alleged Brady issue.” Id. The 
Commonwealth opposed these claims on the merits, but also 
argued that they constituted a Sixth Amendment speedy trial 
claim that had to be exhausted in state court. Id. 
The District Court agreed with the Commonwealth, 
both procedurally and substantively, observing that “[t]he 
prejudice Wilson claims he will suffer as the result of the . . . 
delay is clearly the kind of prejudice the speedy trial right was 
designed to protect against.” Id. at *8. Because Wilson’s 
claims of delay were new claims that arose after the District 
Court issued the writ in 2004 and were unrelated to the 
Batson claim that formed the basis for his petition, they had 
to be exhausted in state court. Id. at *9. The District Court 
also rejected Wilson’s arguments that he was not required to 
exhaust his Rule 60(b) claims and that there was no remedy 
available to him in state court. Id. at *11–12.  Alternatively, 
the District Court held that even if Wilson’s claims did not 
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have to be exhausted, he had not established extraordinary 
circumstances. Id. at *19. 
After Wilson appealed only the District Court’s denial 
of his Rule 60(b) motion, we asked counsel to brief the 
following issues presented by this appeal’s unique procedural 
posture: (1) whether a certificate of appealability is required 
and “whether Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009), bears on 
that issue;” (2) whether the District Court had jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the motion to enforce and the Rule 60(b) motion; 
and (3) whether the Commonwealth complied with the 
District Court’s conditional habeas order by vacating 
Wilson’s conviction on the Swift murder.  
II 
We begin, as we typically do, with the question of 
jurisdiction. Although neither party claims the District Court 
lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Wilson’s motion to enforce 
or his Rule 60(b) motion, “federal courts have an independent 
obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their 
jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide 
jurisdictional questions that the parties . . . elect not to press.” 
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 
1202 (2011) (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 
514 (2006)).  
A 
The parties assert that because Wilson is not appealing 
the denial of the motion to enforce, the question of whether 
the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain that motion is 
now moot. We agree, though it is worth noting that the 
District Court had the power to adjudicate the motion to 
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enforce. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Frank, 500 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 
2007) (holding that district courts have “continuing 
jurisdiction to address alleged noncompliance with 
conditional writ of habeas corpus”) (citing Mickens-Thomas 
v. Vaughn, 355 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 2004)).  
The question of the District Court’s jurisdiction over 
Wilson’s Rule 60(b) motion is not so clear. The issue arises 
frequently after a petitioner is denied a writ of habeas corpus, 
but this appears to be our first opportunity to consider it after 
a petition was granted. Although we have found no 
controlling authority directly on point, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482 (1975) (per 
curiam), suggests that the District Court had jurisdiction to 
adjudicate Wilson’s Rule 60(b) motion. In Pitchess, a state 
prisoner (Davis), won conditional habeas relief and the state 
promptly moved to retry him. Id. at 483–84. In advance of the 
retrial, Davis learned that physical evidence had been 
destroyed in a routine purge after his original trial but before 
the conditional writ had issued. Id. at 484. Davis then filed a 
Rule 60(b) motion in the district court “seeking to ‘modify’ 
its prior conditional writ of habeas corpus and replace it with 
an order granting an absolute writ and enjoining any retrial on 
the pending state charges.” Id. at 484–85. The district court 
granted the motion, concluding that the destruction of 
evidence not only violated Brady, but also constituted an 
incurable defect that precluded Davis from ever receiving a 
fair trial on the charges. Id. Following an affirmance by the 
Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Davis 
had failed to exhaust state remedies on his destruction-of-
evidence claim. Id. at 486–87, 490.  
In its adjudication of the merits of Davis’s appeal, the 
Supreme Court never suggested that the District Court lacked 
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jurisdiction to hear his Rule 60(b) motion. Likewise, in its 
most recent case interpreting the rule, the Supreme Court 
noted that “Rule 60(b) has an unquestionably valid role to 
play in habeas cases,” including cases in which the writ has 
been granted. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005). 
Accordingly, we hold that the District Court had jurisdiction 
to adjudicate Wilson’s Rule 60(b) motion.  
B 
 We next consider our jurisdiction given that the 
District Court denied a certificate of appealability (COA) 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).  The Commonwealth claims a 
COA is required; Wilson disagrees.  
In Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 340–41 (3d Cir. 
1999), we held that a COA is required to appeal the denial of 
a Rule 60(b) motion. However, the vitality of that decision is 
undermined somewhat by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Harbison v. Bell, which stated that the COA requirement 
“governs final orders that dispose of the merits of a habeas 
corpus proceeding—a proceeding challenging the lawfulness 
of the petitioner’s detention.” 556 U.S. at 183. Not all orders 
in habeas cases fit that description, including the motion at 
issue in Harbison, which was “[a]n order that merely denies a 
motion to enlarge the authority of appointed counsel.” Id.; see 
also Jones v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 825, 832 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(suggesting a COA may not be necessary to appeal the denial 
or dismissal of “a valid Rule 60(b) motion,” as opposed to 
one seeking habeas-style relief).  
Irrespective of the impact of Harbison, this appeal 
does not require us to revisit our decision in Morris v. Horn. 
As Wilson argues, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in D’Ambrosio 
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v. Bagley—which conflicts with the District Court’s decision 
in this case—demonstrates that the issue Wilson presents is 
“debatable among jurists of reason.” See Lozada v. Deeds, 
498 U.S. 430, 432 (1991) (per curiam). We therefore grant a 
COA limited to whether the District Court properly denied 
Wilson’s motion to enforce and his Rule 60(b) Motion. 
Accordingly, our jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
§ 2253.3  
III 
 Turning to the merits of Wilson’s appeal, the first and 
most important legal principle guiding our inquiry is that we 
analyze Rule 60(b) motions in the habeas context based on 
the substance of the claim, not the form. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 
at 530–32. We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s legal conclusion that Wilson had to exhaust state 
remedies. Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 
1991) (“[I]n a federal habeas corpus proceeding the 
determination of whether state remedies have been exhausted 
and whether exhaustion should be excused involves the 
application and interpretation of legal precepts.” (citations 
omitted)).  
 
                                                 
3 The Commonwealth relies on Eddleman v. McKee, 
586 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2009), to argue that we lack 
jurisdiction over this appeal because the Commonwealth 
complied with the writ the District Court issued.  As far as the 
motion to enforce is concerned, our precedent forecloses the 
argument.  See Gibbs, 500 F.3d at 205–206.  And as for the 
Rule 60(b) motion, Eddleman does not apply as it was not a 
Rule 60 case. 
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A 
 The crux of Wilson’s argument is that he need not 
exhaust state remedies because he demonstrated 
“extraordinary circumstances” under Rule 60(b). We 
disagree. 
 “The power of a court to invoke Rule 60(b) to vacate 
its own earlier judgment is unquestioned.” Budget Blinds, Inc. 
v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court has made clear that Rule 60 applies only to 
the extent it does not conflict with other statutes. See 
Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 529. Because Wilson’s Rule 60(b) 
motion raises new substantive claims unrelated to the original 
habeas petition, he must exhaust the claims in state court 
before a federal court can hear them unless “(i) there is an 
absence of available State corrective process; or (ii) 
circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to 
protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(b)(1)(B). The exhaustion requirement is not 
jurisdictional, “but rather addresses federalism and comity 
concerns by ‘afford[ing] the state courts a meaningful 
opportunity to consider allegations of legal error without 
interference from the federal judiciary.” Coady v. Vaughn, 
251 F.3d 480, 488 (3d Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257 (1986)). The 
state can waive the exhaustion requirement by failing to raise 
it, Mickens-Thomas, 321 F.3d at 376 n.2, but that did not 
happen here. “The habeas petitioner has the burden of 
proving exhaustion of all available state remedies.” Coady, 
251 F.3d at 488.  
 In Pitchess, the case we cited previously in support of 
our jurisdictional holding, the Supreme Court made clear that 
 13 
 
the exhaustion requirement applies to new claims that a 
successful habeas petitioner may raise in a Rule 60(b) motion. 
421 U.S. at 490. In that case, Davis obtained a writ of habeas 
corpus, but returned to the district court seeking additional 
relief on a new constitutional claim after the state moved to 
retry him. Id. at 484–85. Like Wilson here, Davis filed a Rule 
60(b) motion seeking to “modify” the prior order “and replace 
it with an order granting an absolute writ and enjoining any 
retrial on the pending state charges.” Id. at 485. Reversing the 
lower courts, the Supreme Court held that Davis was “entitled 
to no relief based upon a claim with respect to which state 
remedies have not been exhausted.” Id. at 490. In doing so, 
the Court rejected the very same argument Wilson makes: 
that claims raised in a Rule 60(b) motion need not be 
exhausted. Id. at 489.  
 Wilson’s attempt to avoid exhaustion in state court is 
foreclosed by Pitchess. His claims relating to the delayed 
retrial—which the District Court properly characterized as 
speedy trial claims—have never been presented to the state 
courts and are unrelated to the Batson violation for which he 
was granted habeas relief. As the District Court rightly noted, 
it would be improper for the federal courts “to intervene in 
[Wilson’s] state court criminal proceedings to prevent the 
state court from committing possible future violations of his 
Constitutional rights.” Wilson, 2012 WL 1382447 at *19. 
B 
 Wilson attempts to distinguish Pitchess by relying 
heavily on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in D’Ambrosio v. 
Bagley, 656 F.3d 379, 390 (6th Cir. 2011). In that case, 
D’Ambrosio received a conditional writ of habeas corpus 
because of a Brady violation. Id. at 381. The order required 
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the state to either set aside his conviction and sentence or 
conduct another trial within 180 days. Id. The state moved to 
retry him within the time allotted, but shortly before retrial 
was set to begin, the state notified the defense team about 
additional evidence, which caused the court to delay the trial 
beyond the 180-day window. Id. This prompted the state to 
ask the federal district court to extend the deadline for the 
retrial. Id. D’Ambrosio replied by asking the federal court to 
grant an unconditional writ and bar his reprosecution. Id. at 
381–82. The federal court partially granted D’Ambrosio’s 
motion by issuing an unconditional writ because of the state’s 
continued misconduct. Id. at 382. The court declined to bar 
retrial, however, because D’Ambrosio could not demonstrate 
prejudice from the delay and the court had confidence in the 
state’s ability to provide a fair retrial. Id.  
Around the time the district court declined to bar 
retrial, the state’s key witness died, which required the 
exclusion of his prior testimony under the Confrontation 
Clause. Id. D’Ambrosio then filed a Rule 60(b) motion asking 
the District Court to vacate its earlier order and bar his 
reprosecution in light of the witness’s unavailability, as 
D’Ambrosio had planned to cross-examine the witness about 
the previously withheld Brady material. Id. The district court 
agreed, vacating a portion of its original judgment and 
reasoning that the circumstances were sufficiently 
“extraordinary” to bar D’Ambrosio’s reprosecution. Id. at 
383. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court 
had jurisdiction to grant the Rule 60(b) motion, vacate its 
prior judgment, and issue an unconditional writ of habeas 
corpus. Id.  
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion relied in part on its 
decision in Satterlee v. Wolfenbarger, which noted that 
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although the state usually is not precluded from retrying a 
successful habeas petitioner, “in extraordinary circumstances, 
such as when the state inexcusably, repeatedly, or otherwise 
abusively fails to act within the prescribed time period . . . a 
habeas court may forbid[] reprosecution.” 453 F.3d 362, 370 
(6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
D’Ambrosio met that standard, the court reasoned, because 
his Rule 60(b) motion relied on the same Brady claims that 
formed the basis of his original habeas relief. That fact 
distinguished D’Ambrosio from Fisher v. Rose, 757 F.2d 789 
(6th Cir. 1985), a decision of the Sixth Circuit that ordered 
exhaustion in state court when a petitioner sought an 
unconditional writ based on a speedy trial issue distinct from 
the Confrontation Clause claim raised in his original petition. 
Id. at 389.  
Although Wilson accurately describes D’Ambrosio, we 
are unpersuaded by that opinion. As Judge Boggs opined in 
dissent: “Pitchess makes clear that Rule 60(b) cannot be used 
to circumvent section 2254’s exhaustion requirement, and its 
holding directly controls this case.” D’Ambrosio, 656 F.3d at 
393. We need not repeat the reasons underlying Judge 
Boggs’s dissent because it suffices to say that they are 
essentially the same reasons we have articulated regarding 
Wilson’s duty to exhaust his state court remedies.  
But even assuming that D’Ambrosio was correct, 
Wilson’s case is readily distinguishable. Unlike D’Ambrosio 
(but like the petitioner in Fisher), Wilson does not reprise his 
Batson claim in federal court. Rather, he makes what the 
District Court rightly characterized as an entirely new claim, 
namely, that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy 
trial. Wilson has never presented this claim to the state courts 
and, unlike in D’Ambrosio—where the death of the key 
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witness demonstrated that no state retrial could rectify the 
Brady violation at issue in the original trial—Wilson does not 
contend that the Batson error that tainted his original trial will 
be repeated at his retrial. This critical factual distinction 
renders D’Ambrosio unhelpful to Wilson.  
C 
 Finally, Wilson argues that even if exhaustion is 
required, it would be futile. Wilson Br. 33. Specifically, 
Wilson notes that his health has deteriorated so much since 
2004 that he may no longer be competent to stand trial. Id. at 
22–25. His “longstanding-delusional disorder” has 
intensified, and according to his expert, he is “not able to 
meaningfully assist counsel in the development of a defense 
that is important to the continuance of this proceeding.” Id. at 
23–24. Wilson also contends that the Commonwealth’s main 
witness against him in the Swift case has also “suffered a 
significant and debilitating deterioration in his mental health 
during the period of delay” and consequently may be 
unavailable as a witness on retrial. Id. at 25–26. Wilson 
argues that the Commonwealth is responsible for these 
delays—first, by concealing the evidence underlying his 
Batson claim for ten years, and then by waiting more than 
five years after the District Court granted habeas to move to 
retry him.  
 We express no opinion regarding the merits of these 
claims, since our task is to determine which court should 
adjudicate them in the first instance. As Wilson admitted 
during oral argument in the District Court, he can “raise both 
a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim and a state law speedy 
trial claim pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 600 in the state court.”  Wilson, 2012 WL 1382447 
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at *11. This is inadequate, Wilson insists, because forcing 
him to exhaust his new claims in state court “would subject 
him to the very harm that he sought to prevent when he filed 
the [Rule 60(b)] Motion.” Wilson Br. at 29. Reduced to its 
essence, Wilson’s argument “assumes, ultimately, either the 
incompetence or the bad faith of [the] state judiciary.” 
Eddleman v. McKee, 586 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2009). But 
as we have stated, “[b]y requiring exhaustion, federal courts 
recognize that state courts, no less than federal courts, are 
bound to safeguard the federal rights of state criminal 
defendants.” Parker v. Kelchner, 429 F.3d 58, 61 (3d Cir. 
2005) (quoting Jones v. Keane, 329 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 
2003)). And although the exhaustion requirement in habeas 
cases recognizes exceptions for “extraordinary 
circumstances,” it presumes adequate state remedies. Moore 
v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 448 (3d Cir. 1975). Without more, 
we have held, “[n]othing in the nature of the speedy trial right 
. . . qualif[ies] it as a per se ‘extraordinary circumstance’” 
exempt from the exhaustion requirement. Id. at 446.4  
                                                 
4 Our sister courts have reached the same conclusion. 
See, e.g., Eddleman, 586 F.3d at 413 (reversing district 
court’s decision to bar retrial, describing it as 
“effectively . . . adjudicat[ing] a speedy-trial claim that had 
never been presented to, much less ruled upon, by the . . . 
state courts”); Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 353–54 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (holding that successful habeas petitioner 
complaining of delay in retrial may have speedy trial claim, 
but would have to satisfy exhaustion requirement); Moore v. 
Zant, 972 F.2d 318, 320 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that 
successful habeas petitioner can assert speedy trial rights 
related to the state’s post-habeas delays in his upcoming state 
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IV 
 For the reasons stated, we hold that the District Court 
had jurisdiction to adjudicate Wilson’s Rule 60(b) motion 
filed after he had been issued a writ of habeas corpus. We 
also hold that the District Court did not err when it required 
Wilson to exhaust in state court the new claims he raised in 
his Rule 60(b) motion. We will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
                                                                                                             
proceedings); Fisher v. Rose, 757 F.2d 789, 791–92 (6th Cir. 
1985) (indicating that speedy trial claims, including those 
stemming from delay in retrying successful habeas 
petitioners, are ordinarily subject to exhaustion and listing 
other cases that held the same). 
